In *Forces of Labor*, I put forward a set of theses about the time-space dynamics of world labor unrest from the late-nineteenth century to the present. They can be summed up as follows:

1) The main location of working-class formation and protest has shifted *within* global industries along with shifts in the geographical location of production (*spatial fixes*). Major waves of labor unrest are both a significant cause and a significant effect of this process.

2) The main sites of working-class formation and protest has shifted *from industry to industry* together with the rise/decline of leading sectors of capitalist development (*product fixes*).

3) Intra-industry spatial shifts (thesis #1) tend to be from core (high wage) to more peripheral (low wage) locations (consonant with the expectations of product cycle theory).

4) Technological fixes (the reorganization of the labor process and the introduction of new technologies) have tended to re-establish the competitive advantage of core locales, leading to a reconsolidation of production in the core, and a concomitant reversal of the core-periphery shift in working-class formation/protest.

5) With each spatial *fix* (within a product life cycle), new working-class formation and protest takes place in an increasingly competitive environment, making it more difficult to secure the resources needed to establish stable labor-capital accords and bring labor militancy under control. This thesis is consonant with the thesis that sees the semiperiphery (and increasingly the periphery) as a “zone of turbulence”.

6) Variations from the above dynamics are to be expected as a result of contingent (although not random) outcomes of political struggles that shape relations among labor, capital and states (see for example the discussion of the “Japanese anomaly” in *Forces of Labor*, chapter 2).

The foregoing theses focus on world-economic dynamics; however, the time-space patterning of world labor unrest is also shaped by (and shapes) world-political dynamics. As such:

7) World wars have had a strong effect on the overall pattern of labor unrest: world labor unrest rose on the eve of the world wars, declined during the initial years of the wars, and exploded in their aftermath. This pattern is characteristic not only of the belligerent countries, but also of countries not directly involved in the fighting. The above relationship is less strong in the case of wars that are not world wars.

8) Periods of world hegemonic crisis/breakdown have been periods of relatively high levels of “dysfunctional” social conflict (including dysfunctional labor-capital conflict). Periods of world hegemony have been periods of relatively stable social compacts and low levels of “dysfunctional” social conflict. The “dysfunctional” social conflict that exists tends to be localized outside the core in periods of world hegemony (consonant with thesis #5); it tends to become more spatially widespread in periods of world hegemonic crisis/breakdown.
World labor unrest in periods of hegemonic crisis/breakdown has shaped the institutional structures of subsequent hegemonic world orders in significant ways, transforming the social-political terrain on which world labor unrest unfolds.

Industrialized warfare in the twentieth century increased labor’s bargaining power. Post-industrial warfare in the early twenty-first century has weakened labor’s bargaining power.

One underlying assumption of the foregoing theses is that the outcome of waves of labor unrest depends in important ways on the nature and extent of workers’ bargaining power. Spatiality, in turn, is an important component of the conceptualization and measurement of the main forms of workers’ bargaining power. Thus: Workplace bargaining power is defined as the power that results from the ability of strategically located workers to disrupt production in an entire workplace, firm, industry, national, regional, and/or global economy (or an entire network of distribution, as can be the case with transport workers). Associational bargaining power is defined as the power that comes from the collective organization of workers, which in turn, is shaped by the location of workers within such non-workplace networks as those of kinship, neighborhood and community.