Since the 1980s a good part of my research effort has tried to map structures of corporate power, using interlocking directorates as the key indicator. The literature on interlocking directorates is vast, and theoretical interpretations range from organizational models of exchange and resource dependence (Pennings 1980; Pfeffer 1992) through radical elite formulations of C. Wright Mills (1956) and William Domhoff (1998). In my research program I have drawn primarily upon two streams of Marxist theory. One, beginning with Hilferding (1981[1910]), situates corporate interlocking within the circuitry of capital accumulation under conditions monopoly capital; the other, beginning with Gramsci (1971), sensitizes us to the importance of corporate networks as vehicles for class hegemony. These formulations enable us to grasp two complementary forms of corporate power, the first residing within the actual practices of surplus value appropriation and capital circulation that fall under the strategic control of corporate directors, the second entailing the formation of business communities whose shared world view underwrites an ongoing bid for hegemony in civil society and the state (Carroll 2004, chapter 1).